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Aquinas as an advocate of abortion?: The appeal to ‘delayed animation’ in contemporary Christian 
ethical debates on the human embryo. 
 
Summary 
 
It has become common, in both popular and scholarly discourse, to appeal to ‘delayed animation’ as 
an argument for abortion (DAAA). Augustine and Aquinas seemingly held that the rational soul was 
infused midway in pregnancy, and therefore did not regard early abortion as homicide. The authority 
of these thinkers is thus cited by some contemporary Christians as a reason to tolerate or, for 
proportionate reasons, to promote first-trimester abortion and embryo experimentation. The present 
paper is an exercise in aetiology. It examines the relatively recent origins of DAAA (post 1950). 
Distinctions are drawn between different forms of DAAA in historical context, premises, and 
conclusions. Appeal to precedent alone is a weak argument but some DAAAs raise important 
anthropological questions. Nevertheless even the stronger DAAAs are not indefeasible and it is 
argued that, in case of doubt, the human embryo should be granted the respect and protection due 
to a person. 
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A statement of the argument 
 
The first time that the author came across the argument that is the topic of this paper was in 2001, 
in a statement in the House of Lords by the Anglican Bishop of Oxford, Richard Harries. Referring to 
the legal protection that many Christians (and particularly the Roman Catholic Church) seek to give 
to the human embryo, he stated that: 
 
‘I should like to suggest that it was only in the 19th century that the position became firmed up.  
Earlier Christian thought on this subject indicates an awareness of a developing reality, with 
developing rights as we would put it.’1 
 
This, it transpired, was far from an isolated opinion. It was, rather, an example of an argument that 
has become common both in scholarly and in popular discourse on the status of the human embryo, 
and that has been invoked by legislators both in the United Kingdom and in the United States.  
 
In August 2008 the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, was asked 
when human life begins. She replied: ‘I would say that as an ardent, practicing Catholic, this is an 
issue that I have studied for a long time. And what I know is, over the centuries, the doctors of the 
Church have not been able to make that definition. St Augustine said “at three months.” We don’t 
know. The point is that it shouldn’t have an impact on a woman’s right to choose.’2  
 
The comments of Nancy Pelosi raised a storm of controversy3 and also led to Senator Joe Biden, 
another prominent Catholic politician, being asked the same question. He stated that ‘I voted against 
                                                          
1 Hansard 621 part.16, col.35-37 (22 Jan 2001) 
2 Interview on Meet the Press 24 August 2008. 
3 For example, USCCB News Release ‘Bishops Respond to House Speaker Pelosi's Misrepresentation of Church 
Teaching Against Abortion’; W.E. May, ‘Abortion and Ensoulment: Augustine and Aquinas vs. Pelosi and Biden, 
Part I’ Culture of Life Foundation Briefs September 16, 2008; E.C. Brugger, ‘Pelosi on Abortion’ Culture of Life 
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curtailing the right, criminalizing abortion. I voted against telling everyone else in the country that 
they have to accept my religiously based view that it’s a moment of conception. There is a debate in 
our church, as Cardinal Egan would acknowledge, that’s existed. Back in [the] Summa Theologiae 
when Thomas Aquinas wrote [the] Summa Theologiae he said there was no [soul] – it didn't occur 
until quickening, 40 days after conception.’4  
  
Also in 2008, in the United Kingdom, the newly appointed chair of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, Lisa Jardine, was asked about the Catholic Church’s view on the moral status 
of the human embryo. She replied that, ‘it was only relatively recently that the date at which the 
soul enters the embryo was moved back to fertilisation. St Augustine believed that it happened 
when the baby kicked in the womb - 17 weeks - and that suited for a very long time’.5 
 
Similar comments can be found among Catholic philosophers and theologians who disagree with the 
Magisterial teaching of the Catholic Church. Thus Nick Gier, emeritus professor in the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Idaho, says of Aquinas that, ‘As surprising as it sounds, the greatest 
Catholic theologian, declared infallible[sic] by Pius IX, would have agreed with Roe v. Wade.’6 Again, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether has asserted that ‘A careful study of the Catholic tradition of such major 
theologians as Thomas Aquinas, in the context of modern embryology, in fact supports the pro-
choice position in the first two trimesters’.7  
 
Such comments and publications have not gone unopposed, and there is a lively scholarly counter 
literature showing the consistency of Christian, and particularly Catholic, ethical concern for the 
human embryo over the centuries. What has not been attempted so far is an account of where this 
modern argument came from, when it arose, and what different forms it has taken. The present 
paper is an exercise in aetiology. It considers the reasons for the recent emergence of this argument 
within the Christian tradition. As the argument is framed as an appeal to historical precedent, it is 
fitting to inquire as to the historical precedent of this argument itself. Whence did it emerge?  
 
There are, of course, subtle differences between the claims and conclusions propounded even in 
these few quotations, and this paper will distinguish different forms of the argument. One form 
takes as its premise the proposition that Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and/or other prominent 
Christian theologians held that the rational soul was not present at conception but that it was given 
at a later stage of embryonic development. From this it is argued that these thinkers would not have 
regarded embryonic stem cell research or first-trimester abortion as involving homicide. The moral 
authority of these thinkers, or of the Christian tradition more generally, is thus cited as a reason for 
Christians to tolerate or, for proportionate reasons to promote, embryo experimentation and early 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Foundation Briefs September 2, 2008; To these may be added innumerable more or else well-informed 
discussions on the topic on various blogs. 
4 Interview on Meet the Press 7 September 2008. 
5 S. Byrnes , ‘There is a debate to be had – a serious debate – about conscience: Sholto Byrnes talks to Lisa 
Jardine’, New Statesman 26 May (2008), 24-27. 
6 N. Gier, ‘Catholics May Have Good Reasons To Support Abortion Reform’, The Palouse Pundit 23 May (2007). 
7 R.R. Ruether endorsement of D.A. Dombrowski and R Deltete, A brief liberal Catholic defense of abortion 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). 
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abortion. The aim of this argument is to use the Catholic tradition to undermine the credibility of the 
present teaching of the Catholic Church against abortion and research on human embryos. 
 
A slightly different form of the argument aims to show that consideration of philosophical or 
theological anthropology within a contemporary context justifies conclusions similar to those held by 
Augustine or Thomas Aquinas. Such an argument may well appeal explicitly to Thomistic 
philosophical principles. However, the conclusion is here drawn not from appeal to historical 
precedent per se but from anthropological considerations. Nevertheless, while these forms of the 
argument are distinguishable, they have a common logic: they each invoke delayed animation, or 
some analogous concept, as a reason for tolerating or promoting early abortion and embryo 
experimentation. In this paper, this pattern of argument will be termed delayed animation as an 
argument for abortion (DAAA).  
 
A brief history of delayed animation 
 
Prior to describing the modern emergence of DAAA it is necessary to sketch, even if in the broadest 
terms, the shape of the longer tradition to which the proponents of DAAA appeal: the rise, fall and 
revival of the concept of delayed animation. The following is a very general account and will of 
necessity simplify many aspects of the Western intellectual tradition. It is presented here only to 
show how many different aspects of intellectual culture were touched by the idea that there is a 
fundamental moral and metaphysical transition in the status of the human embryo that occurs at a 
certain point during development. For a more comprehensive account see works by Connery,8 
Jones9 and Dellapenna.10   
 
It is widely accepted that the idea of delayed animation originates with the ancient Greeks. Early 
medical writers11 made a biological distinction, which Aristotle understood to reflect a philosophical 
distinction, between the unformed and the formed embryo. Aristotle argued that the early 
unformed embryo was animated by a vegetative soul and then by a generic sensitive soul and only 
the fully formed embryo was animated by the specific soul of the animal (in the case of human 
beings, the specifically rational soul).12 Aristotle famously thought the body of human embryo was 
fully formed at 40 days for males and 90 days for females.13  
                                                          
8 J. Connery, Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective (Chicago: Loyola University Press 
1977). 
9 D.A. Jones, The Soul of the Embryo: An enquiry into the status of the human embryo in the Christian tradition 
(London: Continuum, 2004). 
10 J.W. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History (Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 
11 See for example, ‘The Seed and The Nature of the Child’ in G.E.R. Lloyd (ed.) Hippocratic Writings J 
Chadwick, W.N. Mann, I.M. Lonie, E.T. Withington (trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1983), pp.317-
346. 
12 Aristotle Generation of Animals 2.3 736b 2-5, though there are good reasons to think that Aristotle held that 
the rational soul was present in the embryo in potentia from the conception. See Jones Soul of the Embryo pp. 
27-30; D.A. Jones ‘Thomas Aquinas, Augustine and Aristotle on “delayed animation”’, The Thomist 
[forthcoming]. 
13 Aristotle History of Animals 7.3, 583b 3-5. 
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From the second century before the Common Era, Greek thought came to exercise a strong 
influence on the practice of Judaism, most evidently through the Septuagint translation of the Jewish 
Scriptures (LXX). One small example is the translation of Exodus 21.22-25, which introduces a 
distinction between the unformed and formed embryo that is not in the Hebrew text.14 The 
distinction later appears in the writings of Philo and later still in some passages in the Talmud. From 
the LXX, and the Old Latin translation of the Bible which was based upon it, the distinction entered 
the Christian tradition especially from the 5th century of the Common Era. This was largely through 
Christian sermons and commentaries on Scripture, of which some of the most influential were by or 
were ascribed to Augustine of Hippo.15  
 
The distinction between the unformed or unanimated embryo and the formed or animated embryo 
was thus present in some Greek medical and philosophical literature, and in both Jewish and 
Christian writings, in the period immediately prior to the emergence of Islam. It is therefore 
unsurprising that very similar ideas are found in the Quran and the Haddith and are reflected in later 
Islamic philosophical and medical writings.16 
  
Within the Western Christian tradition patristic sermon and commentary material began to inform 
the public discipline of the Church, both in relation to books of penance and in relation to various 
penalties of canon law. In some cases the law made no distinction between early and late abortion 
but for some purposes greater penalties were imposed on abortion after ‘animation’.17  
 
When Thomas Aquinas was writing in the 13th century, many of his available sources contained some 
trace of the idea of delayed animation. This was true of the philosophy of Aristotle (especially as 
mediated by earlier Christian and Islamic philosophers), of the theology of Augustine (especially as 
this was mediated by the later Latin tradition) and of canon law. Thomas Aquinas was in fact very 
conventional for a Catholic theologian of his day in holding that ‘the intellectual soul is created by 
God at the end of human generation’,18 by which he meant, after the body of the embryo was 
formed, which for male infants was thought to be at 40 days or there about. 
 
The moral implications of the distinction between unanimated and animated embryo were debated 
among moral theologians from the 15th century (for example, by Antoninus of Florence) to the 18th 
                                                          
14 Jones, Soul of the Embryo pp. 46-56; D.A. Jones ‘Exodus 21 and Abortion’ Triple Helix No.45 (Summer 2009), 
pp. 16-18. 
15  This is somewhat ironic as Augustine was in fact deeply sceptical both about the origin of the soul and the 
timing of animation, See Augustine de anima et eius origine; Jones, Soul of the Embryo pp. 102-108; Jones, 
‘Thomas Aquinas, Augustine and Aristotle’. 
16 Dunstan, G. (ed.) The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, (Exeter: University 
of Exeter Press, 1990). 
17 Connery, Abortion, pp. 46-104; Jones, Soul of the Embryo, pp. 57-74.  
18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2. 
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century (for example, by Alphonsus Liguori).19 However, for much of this time debate was distorted 
by the ‘polemics of the rigorist and the probabiliorists against the laxists and probabilists’.20  
 
From medieval canon law the idea of delayed animation also entered English common law in that 
some jurists held that abortion was an offence only after ‘quickening’, the moment when the child 
was first felt to move. This approach to the legal status of the fetus was reflected in the first statute 
law on abortion in the UK (the Ellenborough Act (1803), the Lansdowne Act (1828)) and in the United 
States (in Connecticut in 1821), all of which include reference to the woman being ‘quick with 
child’.21  
 
The gradual abandonment of delayed animation 
 
The idea of delayed animation, or something closely analogous, was thus reflected in many aspects 
of the Western intellectual tradition – medical-biological, philosophical, theological, canon-legal, 
moral-theological and legal – keeping in mind that each of these strands of the tradition is in fact 
very complex, sometime ambiguous, and not always expressed in the same terms.  
 
The influence of the idea of delayed animation petered out in the mid-19th century, but its zenith 
was much earlier – in the 13th century – and it was arguably already on the wane by the 16th century. 
The effect of the Renaissance and the Reformation had been to undermine the authority of 
scholastic theology and of traditions not rooted in Scripture. A fresh reading of the Scriptures in the 
original languages showed the LXX distinction not to be present in the Hebrew of Exodus, while a 
fresh reading of Augustine showed him to be careful not to deny the possible presence of the soul 
from conception.22 Much more significantly, the scientific revolution of the 17th century dislodged 
reliance on Aristotelian natural science. The scientific investigations of William Harvey and other 
early modern scientists gave reason for tracing the beginning of human life to the moment of 
fertilisation of a human egg.23 Subsequent scientific advances (such as 20th-century discovery of the 
mechanism of genetic inheritance) only served to reinforce the significance of fertilisation and the 
fundamental continuity of development from conception until birth. 
                                                          
19 Connery, Abortion, pp. 105-224; Jones, Soul of the Embryo, pp. 175-193. 
20 C. Curran ‘The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral theology’ reprinting in C. Curran and R. 
McCormick (eds) Moral Theology No. 4: The Use of Scripture in Moral theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1983) 
p. 180. 
21 Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths; J. Keown, Abortion, doctors and the law: Some aspects of the legal 
regulation of abortion in England from 1803 to 1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 3-4, 
10-11; J. Keown, ‘Back to the future of abortion law: Roe's rejection of America's history and traditions’ Issues 
in Law and Medicine 22.1 (2006), pp. 3-37. It should be noticed, however, that the term ‘quick with child’ could 
simply mean pregnant with a living child and not all jurists identified this phrase with ‘quickening’ (i.e. the first 
movement of the child), thus the history of the legal use of this concept requires careful examination of how it 
was applied in actual cases.  
22 On the influence of Augustine on the Reformers, particularly in regard to traducianism see G.H. Williams, 
‘Religious residues and presuppositions in the American debate on abortion’ Theological Studies 31:1 (1970), 
pp. 10-75. 
23 Jones, Soul of the Embryo, pp. 156-174. See also J. Needham, A History of Embryology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1959) which after half a century remains a valuable resource for this topic. 
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By the 19th century when the first statutes were passed against abortion, references to ‘quick with 
child’ were already anachronistic and somewhat of an embarrassment to doctors. In the mid-19th 
century, criminal law (for example, the Offenses Against the Person Act 1837) and Catholic Canon 
Law (in 1869) caught up with biology. By the time the World Medical Association agreed in 1948 to 
‘maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of its conception’24 there was a broad 
medical, philosophical, legal, secular and religious consensus on the identification of fertilisation as 
the beginning of human life.25  
 
The recent re-emergence of delayed animation  
 
In the first half of the 20th century there was thus a broad consensus that human life began at 
conception and was worthy of the ‘utmost respect’ from the very beginning. However, there were 
two factors that sustained interest in delayed animation among theologians during this period. 
 
Within the context of early 20th century Catholic theology, acceptance of delayed animation was 
undoubtedly helped by the decision by Pope Leo XIII to ‘to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, 
and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of 
society, and for the advantage of all the sciences’.26 He effectively established Thomism as the norm 
for philosophy and theology within the Catholic Church, a decision given the force of law in the 1917 
Code of Canon Law.27 This encouraged a generation of philosophers and theologians to see Thomas 
as the most reliable guide in all matters excepting only those which had been condemned 
unequivocally (such as Thomas’s denial of the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary).28 As 
Thomas Aquinas explicitly held that the rational soul was given only after the organs of the embryo 
were formed, this opinion therefore attracted support from a new generation of philosophers and 
theologians. It is this that explains the vigorous defence of delayed animation by writers such as 
Mercier,29 Reany,30 Hering31 and, later, Maritain.32  
                                                          
24 World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva (1948); D.A. Jones, ‘The Hippocratic Oath II: Modern 
adaptations of the classical doctors’ oath’ Catholic Medical Quarterly 56.1 (2006), pp. 6-16. 
25 There is a clear echo of this declaration in the document of the Second Vatican Council on the Church in the 
Modern Word: ‘Therefore from the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care 
while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes’ (Gaudium et Spes 51). 
26 Leo XIII On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy (Aeterni Patris), 4 August 1879, paragraph 31. 
27 Codex Iuris Canonici (1917), Can. 1366. § 2. Note also the irony that the same Code that recommended study 
of Thomas (a defender of delayed animation) also included an excommunication of abortion without reference 
to the time of animation Codex Iuris Canonici (1917), Can. 2350.  
28 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae III, q. 27, a. 2 ad 2, note however that the understanding of the 
immaculate conception, on which the opinion of Thomas is no longer compatible with Catholic dogma, is not 
unrelated to the question of the timing of animation, see Summa Theologiae III, q. 27, a. 2, corpus. Note also 
the irony that the same Code that recommended study of Thomas also included an excommunication for 
abortion without reference to the time of animation Codex Iuris Canonici (1917), Can. 2350. 
29 D.J. Mercier, Psychologie (11 edn) (Paris, 1885). 
30 W. Reany, The Creation of the Human Soul (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1932). 
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The second factor to revive interest in delayed animation was the influence of evolutionary biology. 
In the 19th century Ernst Haeckel had applied ideas of evolution to the embryo. His slogan was 
‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’, that is, the stages of development of the embryo repeat the 
stages of evolution (from simple organism, to fish, to amphibian, to simple mammal, to primate 
etc.).33 Haeckel’s ideas have long since been abandoned by scientists, but the suggestion that there 
is some parallel between the development of the human species and the development of an 
individual human being has remained a powerful idea among philosophers and theologians. In both 
the species and the individual there is an apparent movement from simplicity to complexity. This has 
seemed to some to imply that humanness is not present from the beginning but is something that 
emerges at a certain critical point in the upward movement of complexity.  
 
The relationship of theology and evolution was discussed by a number of thinkers in the Catholic and 
Reformed traditions in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the topic became more prominent among 
Catholic scholars from the middle of the 20th century.  The writer most strongly associated with a 
synthesis of Catholic theology and evolutionary biology was the Jesuit theologian and 
palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin. Although he wrote from the 1920s until his death in 1955, most 
of his works were not published at the time due to their controversial nature. It was only in the 
period after his death that de Chardin’s influence was felt in Catholic theology, both directly through 
his published works,34 and through the writings of confreres such as Karl Rahner.35   
 
Support for delayed animation seems to have increased in the period between 1960 and 1970 as is 
evident from the shift of opinion of the moral theologian Barnard Häring. In 1963 he opined that, 
‘the antiquated opinion of Aristotle [on delayed animation] is at best only slightly probable. To my 
mind it is utterly untenable at least on the practical moral level.’36 However the translator added a 
note in 1967 stating that ‘Some modern theologians and philosophers still hold that the soul is 
created (and infused) sometime after the fertilization of the ovum by the male sperm’37 and quoting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 H.M. Hering, ‘De tempore animationis foetus humani’, Angelicum 28 (1951), pp. 18-29. Not to be confused 
with Bernard Häring. 
32 J. Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, B. Doering (trans.) (Notre Dame IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1997); 
on Maritain see J.G. Hanink, ‘Jacques Maritain and the Embryo: A Master's Muddles’, in J.W. Koterski (ed) Life 
and Learning XVIII, (Washington D.C.: University Faculty for Life, 2008), pp. 249-262. 
33 For an excellent historical overview of this topic see S.J. Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge, MS: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977). 
34 Especially T. de Chardin The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper, 1959), see also H. de Lubac Teilhard 
Explained (Paulist Press, 1968). There is an extensive literature on de Chardin who remains a controversial 
figure in Catholic theology and something of a lightening-rod for popular science writers, being the subject of 
ungrounded slurs as to his honesty as a scientist even by so moderate a commentator as Stephen J. Gould, see 
J.F. Haught God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, pp. 81-88 and p. 199, endnote 3.    
35 Evident, but without acknowledgement, in K. Rahner, Hominization: The Evolutionary Origin of Man as a 
Theological Problem, trans. W. T. O'Hara (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1965), a translation of Overhage P, 
Rahner K. Das problem der hominization, questiones disputatae 12/3. (Freiberg: Herder, 1961). 
36 B. Häring The Law of Christ Vol, III, E.G Kaiser (trans.) (Cork, Ireland: Mercier Press, 1967), p. 206. 
37 Häring Law of Christ, p. 206, translator’s footnote. 
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with approval Richard McCormick (from 1965), ‘The theory of retarded or delayed animation is 
unquestionably a tenable and respectable theory’.38 By 1972 Häring had come to the view that, ‘the 
theory which presents hominization as dependent on the development of the cerebral cortex has its 
own probability’.39  
 
It should be noted, nevertheless, that while McCormick in 1965 and Häring in 1972 defended the 
reasonableness of delayed animation, both continued to defend the prohibition of abortion as the 
proper moral course. Indeed while the influence of the Thomist revival and, later, the influence of 
evolutionary ideas, sustained belief in delayed animation among Catholic theologians before 1950 
and well into the 1960s, this was not invoked in this period as an argument in favour of tolerating of 
early abortion. There was a very strong consensus at this time that, even if animation were later 
than conception, the deliberate destruction of the embryo would be an act akin to murder, a kind of 
‘anticipated homicide’.40 The same attitude is found among Reformed theologians of the period. 
Thus Dietrich Bonhoeffer argues that ‘to raise the question whether we are here concerned already 
with a human being or not is merely to confuse the issue. The simple fact is that God certainly 
intended to create a human being and that this nascent human being has been deliberately deprived 
of his life. And that is nothing but murder.’41  
 
A new argument emerges 
 
Belief in delayed animation does not necessarily imply support for the moral or legal acceptability of 
abortion; in fact, Aquinas himself writes of abortion prior to animation that ‘after the sin of murder, 
whereby a human nature already in actual existence is destroyed, this sort of sin seems to hold the 
second place’.42 Thus, the history of DAAA is not co-extensive with the history of delayed animation, 
neither in its early 20th century form nor in its earlier medieval or patristic forms. DAAA is a new 
argument that did not emerge until there had been a shift in social attitudes so that toleration or 
promotion of abortion came to be regarded as something morally or politically attractive. In the late 
19th and early 20th century most feminists and social reformers viewed illegal abortion as a social evil 
that was harmful for women, but they did not advocate legalised abortion as the solution to this 
evil.43 However, in the 1920s and 1930s initially within the context of the eugenics and birth control 
movements, legal abortion came to be re-interpreted as a means to alleviate the suffering of women 
as well as being a part of the solution to other alleged social problems (of overpopulation and of 
‘racial hygiene’).44  
                                                          
38 R. McCormick, ‘A Human Stand on Abortion’, America 112 (1965), 877-81. 
39 B. Häring Medical Ethics (Slough, UK: St Paul Publications, 1972), p. 84. 
40 Reany Creation of the Human Soul p. 196. 
41 D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton Smith (New York: Macmillan Bonheoffer, 1955), p. 131. 
42 Summa contra gentiles III, q. 122, see also Commentary on the sentences IV, d. 31, q. 4. 
43 M.K. Derr, R. MacNair, and L. Naranjo-Huebl ProLife Feminism: Yesterday & Today 2nd edition. (Philadelphia, 
PA: Feminism & Nonviolence Studies Association, 2005). While this is a contested history in relation to its 
implications in a contemporary context, there is general agreement that 18th and 19th century predecessors of 
contemporary feminism were opposed to the practice of abortion.  
44 A. Farmer Prophets and Priests: The Hidden Face of the Birth Control Movement (London: The Saint Austin 
Press, 2002). 
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The founding of the Abortion Law Reform Association in the United Kingdom in 1936 and the Bourne 
judgement of 1938 were expressions of this new attitude. The abortion law reform movement was 
complex and encompassed more than one agenda, but from it emerged what was to be an 
enormously powerful idea in 20th century gender politics - that access to ‘safe abortion’ should be 
seen as a constituent element of women’s emancipation. By the 1950s within a number of countries 
the advocacy of legal abortion had become part of a larger liberalising social agenda (affecting 
attitudes to contraception, homosexuality, and divorce as well as a hotchpotch of other issues).45  
 
It is this cultural shift, which was gathering pace in the 1950s and 1960s that provides the context 
that explains the emergence of the DAAA. Scholars who understood themselves as ‘liberal’46 and 
who regarded the new social agenda as fundamentally positive, turned to Augustine, Aquinas, and 
the idea of delayed animation in search of historical precedent for a more permissive approach to 
abortion. This same appeal occurred independently a number of times within different intellectual 
contexts, which in turn led to the emergence of subtly distinct forms of DAAA. These could no doubt 
be categorised in various ways but here are divided between secular expressions of the argument, 
Anglican expressions of the argument, and Catholic expressions of the argument. 
 
Secular expressions of the argument  
 
In secular bioethics 
 
Perhaps the first proponent of a form of DAAA was Joseph Fletcher in 1954 in his ground-breaking 
work Morals and Medicine.47 This book is sometimes regarded as the first example of modern 
bioethics. Fletcher was at that time an Episcopalian but the logic of this approach was essentially 
humanist, and over time he came to regard himself and his approach as secular humanist. Fletcher 
invoked the history of belief in delayed animation in the Catholic tradition as a way to undermine 
the credibility of contemporary Catholic teaching. He did not take the concept of delayed animation 
itself to be illuminating or authoritative. Rather, by drawing attention to an apparent change in 
Catholic teaching, Fletcher charged the Church with inconsistency and effectively weakened the 
authority both of the present and of the past teaching. 
 
Fletcher’s own view, developed over a number of books, was that humanness required the ability to 
exercise of higher human capacities such as thought and deliberation. Hence he did not regard a 
child as human until several months after the child was born, and he opened the door not only 
abortion but also to infanticide. Fletcher’s ideas were taken up by a later generation of secular 
bioethicists including Michael Tooley,48 John Harris49 and Peter Singer.50 Nevertheless, Peter Singer 
                                                          
45 This is not to defend the labels of liberal and conservative in relation to social issues, but only to describe a 
frame within which these issues came to be discussed or understood during and since the 1960s. 
46 For examples of the self-description of ‘liberal’ in relation to abortion see, for example, J. Donceel, ‘A Liberal 
Catholic View’, in R. Hall (ed) Abortion in a Changing World (New York: Columbia UP, 1970); Dombrowski and 
Deltete, A brief liberal Catholic defense of abortion; W. McLennan, ‘Breath is life: Defending abortion from a 
liberal Christian perspective’, UU World Winter 11.1.09. 
47 J. Fletcher Morals and Medicine (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1954). 
48 M. Tooley, Abortion and infanticide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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has defended the Catholic Church against the charge of inconsistency in this regard. The Church’s 
change of mind on delayed animation occurred not because of abandoning ethical or philosophical 
principles but because these principles were now informed by a new biology: 
 
‘But the reason for the church’s change of view on the stage of pregnancy at which abortion 
becomes the killing of a human being was surely, within the terms of its own view of the sanctity of 
human life, a sound one. Once modern biology had shown the actual nature of early human 
development, the church had little choice but to abandon its support for the unscientific Aristotelian 
embryology of Thomas Aquinas. (Liberal Catholics will hardly want to condemn one of the few 
instances in which the church has been willing to modify its views in the light of new scientific 
knowledge)’51  
 
The use of DAAA by Fletcher and by other secular bioethicists obscures the more fundamental 
difference of this approach to bioethics from the Catholic ethical tradition, that is, the question of 
whether the life of every human being is morally inviolable. Singer is perceptive in acknowledging 
the logic of the Catholic ethical tradition given its fundamental principles and hence the weakness of 
this particular form of DAAA. 
 
In legal contexts 
 
Another early context for the emergence of DAAA was among lawyers, beginning in 1957 with 
Glanville Williams, then reader in law at Cambridge University. In his book The Sanctity of Life and 
the Criminal Law52 he invoked delayed animation as an example of the alleged inconsistency of 
contemporary Catholic theological accounts of the beginning of life with earlier Catholic beliefs (a 
form of DAAA which echoes that of Fletcher, whom he had read).53 However Williams also 
introduces another form of the argument which implicitly appeals to the tradition of delayed 
animation not as a reductio ad absurdum but as a precedent, in that, according to Williams, the 
common law had tolerated abortion prior to ‘quickening’.  
 
His book is not a systematic work of legal philosophy and at times the purported logic of the 
argument is obscure, but the argument seems to be that the distinction of early and later abortion, 
which was once held for theological reasons, may still be followed but for a different reason. This 
reason, according to Williams is the ‘humane, ethical, and parental feeling of the plain man [that] 
leads him to wish to extend the protection of the criminal law not only to the newly born child but to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
49 J. Harris, ‘Book Review: Abortion and Infanticide’, Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (1985), p. 212; J. Harris, 
‘Euthanasia and the Value of Life’ in J. Keown Euthanasia Examined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). 
50 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
51 P. Singer, Rethinking life and death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) p. 87. 
52 Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1957). 
53 Williams describes Fletcher as ‘a Liberal Protestant’ and says of his work, ‘the Christian humanist approach 
of this book is at the opposite pole from that of dogmatic and authoritarian religion’, Williams, Sanctity of Life 
p. 131. 
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the viable child before birth’.54 However, this appeal to feeling is a weak argument, for the feelings 
of the ‘plain man’ have varied over time and between different cultures. Furthermore it is 
disingenuous for Williams to appeal to cultural abhorrence of infanticide when he himself attributes 
this attitude among modern secular people to the ‘legacy of their religious heritage’.55 In contrast, 
Williams’ own view is that the killing of ‘a viable monster or an idiot child’ by his or her mother 
‘exactly paralleled by the bitch that kills her mis-shaped puppies, cannot confidently be pronounced 
immoral’.56  
 
While Glanville Williams was not clear or consistent in his use of DAAA, his argument was taken up 
by others, most notably Eugene Quay and Cyril Means57 who construed the quickening distinction as 
defining a ‘common law liberty to abortion’. Such is the value of precedence within a legal context 
that jurists who wished to liberalise the abortion law openly appealed to this distinction despite its 
acknowledged religious provenance.  
 
The most politically significant effect of this form of DAAA was in helping to shape the United States 
Supreme Court judgement Roe v Wade [1973] which declared unconstitutional all existing statutes 
restricting first and second-trimester abortion. Justice Blackmun in his opinion cited Williams, Quay, 
and Means and was unafraid himself to venture into theology, stating for example, that ‘The 
theological debate was reflected in the writings of St. Augustine, who made a distinction between 
embryo inanimatus, not yet endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus. He may have drawn upon 
Exodus 21:22.’58 
 
In contrast to the invoking of delayed animation by Fletcher, which was purely to undermine the 
authority of Catholic beliefs, the form of DAAA developed by Glanville Williams and cited with 
approval in Roe v Wade, is effectively an attempt to appeal to the authority of the delayed-
animation tradition as precedent, through its impact on the English common law. However this 
difference helps identify a fundamental flaw in the legal form of the argument. If ‘the importance 
attached to quickening rests on what now appears to be a rather obvious superstition’59 then it 
cannot reasonably function as a moral or legal precedent.60  
                                                          
54 Williams, Sanctity of Life, p. 230. 
55 Williams, Sanctity of Life, p. 19 
56 Williams, Sanctity of Life, pp. 19-20. 
57 E. Quay, ‘Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations’, Georgetown Law Journal 49 (winter 1960 
and spring 1961), pp. 173-241, 395-443; C.C. Means, ‘The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status 
of the Fetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality’, 14 N.Y.L.F. 419 (1968); C.C. Means, ‘The 
Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is A Penumbral Or Ninth Amendment Right About To Arise From the 
Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?’, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). 
58 Roe v Wade , 410 U.S. 133 (1973) Opinion of Justice Blackmun, footnote 22. 
59 Williams Sanctity of Life p. 230. 
60 The legal form of DAAA has no basis unless it can address the underlying question of anthropology. An 
account of what it would be to take the common law tradition and the quickening distinction seriously as a 
precedent would require analysing the anthropology that shaped it, and asking what the equivalent holds in a 
modern context. However, one of the few examples of just such an attempt concludes that ‘the policy and 
logic of the common and statutory law argues for extending legal protection to human life from conception’ 
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The form of DAAA developed by Glanville Williams and other jurists was essentially opportunistic. It 
was an appeal to a tradition the basis of which they did not share. It is no doubt for this reason that 
legal forms of DAAA are marked by poor historical61 and theological scholarship.62 A credible form of 
DAAA requires proponents who have sufficient intellectual sympathy with the Christian tradition 
that they can invoke this tradition as their own.63 This is not generally true of secular expressions of 
the argument but it is true in two other contexts: among Anglican scholars; and among Roman 
Catholics.  
 
Anglican expressions of the argument  
 
Appeal to the Christian tradition 
 
DAAA typically takes the form of appeal to Christian tradition. It is for this reason that it has not 
generally been prominent among most of the Churches of the Reformation, which from their 
foundation have been critical of appeal to tradition as a basis for Christian doctrine, and have 
preferred to base doctrine directly on Scripture. Liberal Protestantism has added an emphasis on 
contemporary experience and on Biblical criticism, but has remained critical of tradition as a source 
of Christian authority.64 In contrast, the Church of England and the Churches that comprise the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
M.S. Scott, ‘Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed to Use’, 1 
Michigan Law and Policy Review 268 (1996).  
61 Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths; Keown, ‘Back to the future’; J. Keown and D.A. Jones, ‘Surveying the 
Foundations of Medical Law: A Reassessment of Glanville Williams’s The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law’, 
Medical Law Review 16 (2008), pp. 85-126. 
62 C.B. Daly, Morals, Law and Life (Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds, 1962); Keown and Jones, ‘Surveying the 
Foundations’. A characteristic example of the weakness of theological scholarship is found in the Roe v Wade 
judgement itself. Augustine’s De Origine Animae 4.4 is cited as ‘Pub.Law 44.527’. One can only surmise that 
someone with no knowledge of theology has, without checking the reference, expanded a citation of P.L. 
44.527. This is of course a reference to Patrologia Latina 44.527. It might be added that the distinction 
ascribed to Augustine by Williams (and repeated by Blackmun) between the embryo inanimatus or the embryo 
animatus occurs nowhere in Augustine’s voluminous writings (see Jones, ‘Thomas Aquinas, Augustine and 
Aristotle’, note 53). 
63 In addition to secular and Christian forms of DAAA, there are some examples of DAAA by those of another 
faith using Christianity as a foil for their own account, for example D. Feldman, Marital Relations, Birth Control 
and Abortion in Jewish Law (New York: Schocken Book, 1974) who takes most of his description of the Catholic 
tradition primarily from Fletcher Morals and Medicine. Such accounts have in common with secular forms of 
DAAA the opportunistic use of an alien tradition, and share the typically weakness of secular accounts. 
Because the account of the Catholic tradition is so minimal and little more than caricature, they succeed only 
in knocking down a straw man.    
64 As argued eloquently by John Barton in his Inaugural lecture on the future of Old Testament Study, ‘Criticism 
in biblical scholarship, exactly like Protestantism in religion, might take as its motto St Cyprians dictum: 
“custom without truth is just error in its old age”’. J. Barton The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and 
Theology: Collected Essays of John Barton, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) p. 163 quoting Cyprian Letter 74 (ad 
Pompeium) §9. 
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Anglican Communion are more open to arguments from tradition, though of course this is more so 
in some strands of Anglicanism than others.65  
 
As a secular legal form of DAAA played a role in the United States Supreme Court decision to 
overturn legal restrictions on abortion, so an Anglican form played a role in the legalisation of 
abortion in the United Kingdom. The Abortion Act 1967 was preceded by an influential report of the 
Board of Social Responsibility in 1965, Abortion: An Ethical Discussion. This report concluded that ‘in 
certain circumstances abortion can be justified’.66 The listed circumstances included not only a 
threat to the life of the mother, but also a threat to her ‘well-being’ which was understood to 
include the ‘well-being of her family’. These conclusions were reached not only by reflection on the 
current social situation but also ‘in the light of traditional discussions’, including discussion of the 
tradition of delayed animation. The report rejected the idea of a particular moment of ensoulment 
but argued nevertheless that the moral status of the embryo increased gradually pari passu with 
biological development. This moral gradualism was then read back into the traditional distinctions: 
‘In the old tradition the [gradualist] principle was recognized, as has been seen, in the distinction 
between an animate and an inanimate foetus, and between pregnancy before and after 
quickening’.67  
 
The Committee that wrote Abortion: An Ethical Discussion was far from reflective of all Anglicans. 
Nevertheless, the report was important for giving Christian endorsement to liberalisation of the law 
on abortion, at a time when very few countries had yet done so.  
 
The secretary to that committee was Gordon Dunstan, a prominent Anglican moral theologian who 
would invoke a similar form of DAAA twenty years late in a related moral and political controversy. 
In 1984, he submitted a paper to the Warnock Committee which was subsequently published in the 
Journal of Medical Ethics.68 There he argued that ‘the claim to absolute protection for the human 
embryo “from the beginning” is a novelty in the Western, Christian and specifically Roman Catholic 
moral traditions.’69 He appealed to various examples of graded status but centrally to the concept of 
delayed animation. Dunstan’s argument was influential in the debate leading up to the passing of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 which permitted experimentation on human 
embryos. The same argument was reiterated ten years later by Archbishop Peter Carnley, Primate of 
the Anglican Church of Australia,70 and by Bishop Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford,71 in the context 
                                                          
65 The Churches of the East share with Anglicans a respect for tradition, but DAAAs have not emerged in an 
Orthodox context in part because delayed animation is less prominent in the Eastern Christian tradition (and 
was opposed by Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the Great, and Maximus the Confessor) and in part because the 
Churches of the East have not developed modern schools of theology analogous to liberal Anglicanism.  
66 Board of Social Responsibility Abortion: An Ethical Discussion (London: Church Information Office, 1965), p. 
61. 
67 BSR Abortion, p. 29. 
68 G.R. Dunstan, ‘The moral status of the human embryo: a tradition recalled’, J Med Ethics 1 (1984), pp. 38-44. 
69 Dunstan, ‘Moral status of the human embryo’, p. 38. 
70 P. Carnley, ‘Such is Life’, The Bulletin April 16 (2002), pp.36-38. 
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of a new debate over whether to permit the cloning of human embryos for research. In 2001, Bishop 
Harries was appointed chair of the House of Lord Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, which 
devoted an appendix of its report to a statement of Dunstan’s argument: ‘the fact that the Christian 
tradition, for so much of its history, made a distinction between the moral status of the unformed 
and the formed embryo, and thought of the human person in the full sense coming only with a 
delayed ensoulment, remains significant: it reflects a valid moral distinction’.72 
 
The structure of Dunstan’s version of DAAA was similar to that of Glanville Williams but it was the 
work of independent scholarship73 and included a few characteristically Anglican touches, for 
example in mentioning Anglo-Saxon penitentials as well as the English common law tradition, and in 
paying more attention to Augustine than to Aquinas. Dunstan’s scholarship is far superior to that of 
Glanville Williams but it is open to some of the same criticisms, not least that it sought to appeal to 
historical precedent while bypassing the key question of whether the notion of delayed animation is 
valid in the context of contemporary biology. The moral tradition to which Dunstan appealed was 
explicitly based on a theological anthropology, itself derived from philosophical reflection on ancient 
biology. That biology is antiquated, and to attempt an argument from precedent in the absence of a 
contemporary philosophical anthropology is to build a house on sand. It is an argument without 
rational foundation.74  
 
Appeal to evolutionary biology  
 
Bishop Ian Ramsey, who chaired the 1965 Board of Social Responsibility committee, was noted both 
for speaking on ethical and social questions, and for his interest in the relationship between science 
and religion. This alerts us to another form of DAAA to develop within the Anglican tradition. While 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
71 Hansard Vol.621, No.16, col.35-37; See R. Harries, ‘Delivering Public Policy: The Status of the Embryo and 
Tissue Typing’, Studies in Christian Ethics 18 (2005), pp. 57-74; R. Harries, ‘The Beginning Of Life’, Ecclesiastical 
Law Journal 5 (2000), pp. 396-407. 
72 House of Lords Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, Stem Cell Research, (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2002), Appendix 4: The moral status of the early embryo: reading the Christian 
tradition. 
73 Glanville Williams, in addition to Fletcher Morals and Medicine, took his primary sources from Reany The 
Creation of the Human Soul and R.J. Huser The Crime of Abortion in Canon Law (The Catholic University of 
America, Canon Law Studies No. 162: Washington D.C., 1942). In contrast Dunstan used as his main secondary 
sources A. Chollet, ‘Animation’, in: A. Vacant and E. Mangenot (eds.) Dictionnaire de theologie Catholique 
(Paris: Latouzey et Ane, 1903) and J. Delmaille, ‘Avortement’, in Naz R, ed. Dictionnaire de droit canonique 
(Paris: Latouzey et Ane, 1938) in addition to which he also engaged with primary sources that he discovered 
independently. It should be noted that none of these earlier Catholic writers (Chollet, Delmaille, Reany or 
Huser) invoke delayed animation as a reason to tolerate abortion. 
74 Dunstan’s DAAA also embodies the non sequitur with which this paper started, the supposition that delayed 
animation would imply that the human embryo should be available for experimental purposes, despite the fact 
that the Christian tradition itself never sanctioned the deliberate destruction of human life, see D.A. Jones, 
‘The human embryo in the Christian tradition: a reconsideration’ Journal of Medical Ethics 31. 12 (December 
2005), pp. 710-714; D.A. Jones, ‘A Theologians’ Brief On the place of the human embryo within the Christian 
tradition and the theological principles for evaluating its moral status’, Ethics and Medicine 17.3, (Fall 2001), 
pp. 143-153.  
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Dunstan’s argument gained significant attention during the debates over embryo experimentation, 
arguably the most prominent Anglican voice in support of such experimentation was that of 
Archbishop John Habgood. His academic background was not in history or moral theology but in 
biology. As noted above, one of the factors that maintained support for delayed animation (or 
analogous concepts) during the twentieth century was theological reflection on the theory of 
evolution. This was certainly true of Habgood whom Mary Warnock described as a ‘Darwinian 
gradualist’: ‘“Christianity”, he said, “no more requires us to believe that human life begins at a 
certain moment than it requires belief in the Garden of Eden.”’75  
 
Habgood’s version of DAAA in favour of experimentation on human embryos is representative of 
many Anglicans who have written on the relationship of science and religion. A similar view is taken 
John Polkinghorne,76 Donald Mackay,77 and several others.78 A typical move of these thinkers is to 
view consciousness and other distinctively human functions as emergent properties of complex 
hierarchical systems. This frame is then applied both to evolution and to embryonic development. In 
each case life is not regarded as specifically human life until it has reached a certain level of 
biological complexity. From this anthropological claim, the moral conclusion is then drawn that early 
human embryos, not having full human status, can be used, created, and destroyed for the benefit 
of those who are fully human, that is, those who have been born.  
 
This form of DAAA, unlike that of Dunstan, is rooted in anthropology and in a broader understanding 
of the relationship of science and religion and is thus a much more serious argument. Nevertheless, 
it relies on a parallel between evolution and developmental biology which is questionable both in 
relation to biology and in relation to philosophy. Biologically, development is clearly distinct from 
evolution in that the process is strongly teleological, moving towards a determinate end point. The 
embryo is already a radically complex system as is evident from the active process of development in 
which it is engaged. It seems prima facie that to regard the human embryo as though it were morally 
equivalent to a nonhuman organism is a mistake. However, to resolve the issue would require 
careful philosophical analysis and it is here that many writers on science and religion tend to be 
weakest. Many are ordained scientists who have come directly from natural science to theology 
without higher studies in philosophy.  
 
The form of DAAA propounded by Habgood and others raises important questions of how to relate 
theological anthropology to modern biology. Nevertheless, without a more robust philosophical 
analysis of the issues, the argument remains at the level of suggestive parallels rather than of 
rigorous demonstration. This gap could perhaps be bridged through a greater engagement with 
Catholics writing on science and religion, in particular those in the Thomist tradition, which draws 
heavily both on theological and on philosophical modes of thought.79 This leads us to consider the 
                                                          
75 M. Warnock, ‘The Bioethics of Reproduction: Have the problems changed?’ in S. Sweeny and I. Hodder (eds.) 
The Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 44.  
76 J. Polkinghorne, ‘The person, the soul, and genetic engineering’, J Med Ethics 30 (2004), pp. 593–7. 
77 D. Mackay, ‘The Beginnings of Personal Life’, In the Service of Medicine 30.2, (1984), pp. 9-13; D. Mackay, 
Human Science and Human Dignity (Hodder & Stoughton, 1979), pp. 64-5 and 98-102. 
78 For example, John Bryant, see J. Bryant and J. Searle, Life in Our Hands: A Christian Perspective on Genetics 
and Cloning (Leicester: IVP, 2004). 
79 For examples of Thomists engaging seriously with modern biology, though coming to different views see N. 
Ford When Did I begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science (Cambridge: 
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expression of DAAA with a Catholic context. However, before examining Catholic forms of DAAA it is 
important to acknowledge the diversity of theological views within put the Anglican tradition.  
 
Diversity within the Anglican tradition 
 
The arguments put forward by figures such as Ramsey, Habgood, Harries, Polkinghorne and Harries 
proved influential in part because they were useful to a succession of governments who wished to 
have ecclesial endorsement of ethically controversial proposals. However, it should not be thought 
that this approach represents the only, or the official, or even the predominant Anglican 
understanding of the human embryo. When the Abortion Act 1967 finally came to a vote in the 
House of Lords, Bishop Ian Ramsey, who had been the chair of the Board of Social Responsibility 
committee, was the only Anglican bishop to vote in favour of the social clause. Similarly, in February 
1985, the General Synod rejected the gradualist position set out by the Board in its response to the 
Warnock Committee.80  
 
Subsequent to this vote, the Board published a very balanced report Personal Origins (1985), which 
set out two views, one which, ‘takes its point of reference in the continuity of the individual 
subject’81 and the other which, ‘argues that there are attributes which must be possessed by a 
developing embryo before it can be called a person’.82 The committee came to recognise ‘in both 
these approaches the possibility of a scientifically judicious and theologically responsible set of 
convictions’.83 Only in the context of endorsing this more balanced report did the Synod accept the 
value of the Warnock Report recommendation for a regulatory body to ‘continue the debate on the 
moral aspects of technologies concerned with human embryology and fertilisation’.84  
 
The 1985 Report Personal Origins represents a significant achievement in recognising two strands of 
theology within the Anglican tradition.85 More frequently the Board of Social Responsibility (and its 
success department) has reflected only the gradualist view and has failed to acknowledge the 
seriousness of views present in Personal Origins and in votes of the Synod. For example, in 2007 the 
Mission and Public Affairs Council wrote that ‘we do not regard the preimplantation embryo as yet 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cambridge University Press, 1988); W. Wallace, ‘Aquinas’s Legacy on Individuation, Cogitation and 
Hominization’, in D. Gallagher (ed) Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy (Washington, DC.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1994); and N. Austriaco. ‘Immediate Hominization from the Systems Perspective’, National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 4.4, (Winter 2004), pp. 719 – 738. Ford’s views are discussed further below. 
80 P.J. O’Mahony A Question of life: Its beginning and transmission (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), pp. 115-
116. See also T. Banchoff Embryo Politics: Ethics and Policy in Atlantic Democracies (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011), p. 40 and for a later Synod debate p. 143. 
81 Board of Social Responsibility Personal origins: The Report of a Working Party on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology of the Board of Social Responsibility (London: CIO publishing, 1985), paragraph 87, emphasis in the 
original. 
82 BSR Personal origins, paragraph 88. 
83 BSR Personal origins, paragraph 90. 
84 General Synod Resolution of July 1985. 
85 The second revised edition was published in 1996 but this kept the recognition of two strands of Anglican 
theological reflection on the human embryo.  
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having the same status of a person made in the image of God’.86 This may be contrasted with the 
resolution of the General Synod of 1983 (reiterated in 1988) ‘that all human life, including life 
developing in the womb, is created by God in his own image and is therefore to be nurtured, 
supported and protected’.87 It should also be noted that in 2001 Archbishop Rowan Williams was 
among a number of Anglican theologians to sign an ecumenical statement declaring that ‘Though 
penalties have varied, the Christian tradition has always extended the principle of the sacredness of 
human life to the very beginning of each human being, and never allowed the deliberate destruction 
of the fruit of conception’.88 
 
Catholic expressions of the argument 
 
Appeal to Catholic tradition 
 
It was in the 1960s that some Catholic scholars began to suggest that delayed animation might 
render abortion or embryo destruction morally acceptable, given sufficiently grave circumstances.89 
By the end of that decade there were, for the first time, clear examples of DAAA within the Catholic 
tradition. One of the leading proponents was the Jesuit Joseph Donceel in a series of articles, the 
most significant appearing in Theological Studies in 1970 under the title, ‘Immediate Animation and 
Delayed Hominization’.90 The Catholic moral theologian Lisa Sowle Cahill refers to this as ‘one of the 
first proposed revivals of delayed hominization’.91 Much of Donceel’s article is devoted to an account 
                                                          
86 Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill - Written Evidence, Memorandum by the 
Church of England's Mission and Public Affairs Council (Ev 68), emphasis added. 
87 General Synod Resolution of July 1983, emphasis added. 
88 Jones, ‘A Theologians’ Brief’. Banchoff Embryo Politics, p. 144.  For a more thorough going theological 
critique of the gradualist position from Anglican perspective see O. O’Donovan Begotten or Made? (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984) or M. Banner, ‘Christian anthropology at the beginning and end of life’, in M. Banner 
Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
89 C. Curran, ‘Abortion: Its Legal and Moral Aspects in Catholic Theology’, in C. Curran New Perspectives in 
Moral Theology Dotre Dame, IN: Fides Publishers inc, 1974) gives a useful overview of the state of debate at 
that time. He begins by claiming that ‘Until a few years ago there was no debate within Catholicism on the 
question of abortion’ (p. 179) and the earliest example he gives of a Catholic theologian seriously questioning 
the received tradition is J. Donceel, ‘Abortion: Mediate v. Immediate Animation’, Continuum 5 (Spring 1967), 
pp. 167-71. One year earlier than this is Karl Rahner who in his essay originally published in German in 1966 
states that ‘Of course it does not follow from the fact of such uncertainty [regarding the time of animation] 
that experiments with fertilised embryonic material are equivalent to morally indifferent experiments with 
mere ‘things’. But it would be conceivable that, given a serious positive doubt about the human quality of the 
experimental material, the reasons in favour of experimenting might carry more weight, considered rationally, 
than the uncertain rights of a human being whose very existence is in doubt.’ K. Rahner, ‘The problem of 
genetic manipulation’ in K. Rahner Theological Investigations Vol 9, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
1972), p. 236. There may be earlier examples but the debate does not become prominent until the end of that 
decade.  
90 J. Donceel, ‘Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization’, Theological Studies, 31.1, (1970), pp. 76-105; 
see also Donceel, ‘Abortion: Mediate v. Immediate Animation’, and Donceel, ‘A Liberal Catholic View’. 
91 L.S. Cahill, ‘The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts’, Theological Studies 54 (1993), p. 135. 
18 
 
of the Catholic tradition aiming to show by diverse examples that it provides strong precedent for 
belief in delayed animation.92 The article then concludes with a quotation from the Board of Social 
Responsibility report Abortion: An Ethical Discussion, invoking ecumenical considerations as a way to 
introduce the moral claim that delayed animation supports a more permissive attitude to abortion, 
‘Might it [embryonic life prior to hominization] not be terminated occasionally for very grave 
reasons, the reasons which other Christian churches consider sufficient?’93  
 
Donceel’s articulation of a Catholic form of DAAA was followed by a number of other scholars 
including Charles Curran,94 Carol Tauer,95 Daniel Maguire96 and Daniel Dombrowski.97 Though there 
are differences in approach and style between these authors (Curran, for example, being more 
restrained in his conclusions, Maguire more overtly polemical) they have in common a form of DAAA 
that is an appeal to the Roman Catholic tradition by writers who situate themselves within that 
tradition. These authors also have in common the use of the conceptual framework of probabilism. 
This is an approach to moral theology that was developed by Catholic writers in the early modern 
period and which continued to structure moral theological debate well into the 19th century. 
Probabilism was the doctrine that it is lawful for a Catholic to follow a ‘probable’ opinion (that is, 
one based on the reasonable arguments of trustworthy authorities) even if the opposite view 
appears to be more probable. Curran, Tauer and others argued that, using this approach, the fact 
that many reputable theologians (such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and, more recently, Karl 
Rahner and Bernard Häring) had supported delayed animation made this opinion ‘probable’. This in 
turn, they argued, permitted Catholics in good conscience to act on the view that early abortion was 
not homicide and that in some circumstances it could be tolerated.   
 
Of all forms of DAAA by appeal to precedent, this form is the most sophisticated, far more so than 
that of Williams or even that of Dunstan. The historical scholarship especially of Charles Curran is 
careful and detailed and he has clear intellectual sympathy with the tradition to which he appeals, 
especially in relation to 17th-century probabilists. However, even this Catholic form of DAAA faces a 
                                                          
92 Donceel’s account of the tradition relies heavily on Challot ‘Animation’, Hering ‘De tempore animationis’ and 
H. de Dorlodot, ‘A Vindication of the Mediate Animation Theory’, in E. C. Messenger (ed) Theology and 
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94 Curran, ‘Abortion’. 
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97 Dombrowski and Deltete, A brief liberal Catholic defense of abortion. 
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number of significant problems. In the first place, if the opposite opinion – that ensoulment occurs 
at fertilisation – is acknowledged also to be probable (being based on the reasonable arguments of 
other trustworthy authorities) then what is at stake in choosing between these two opinions is not 
only liberty of conscience but also the danger of killing what may well be an ensouled human being. 
This was the conclusion reached by Häring in 1963, ‘every mortal attack upon a life which is at least 
probably an actual human life manifests the spirit and disposition of a murderer’98 for, as Grisez 
would later argue, ‘to be willing to kill what for all one knows is a person is to be willing to kill a 
person’.99  
 
Furthermore, while the Catholic tradition provides precedent for believing in delayed animation, it 
provides very little precedent for permitting abortion prior to the purported moment of animation. 
Modern advocates of DAAA appeal to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but neither Augustine nor 
Thomas Aquinas advocated tolerance of abortion. If precedent is to be found for DAAA, this cannot 
be found in the tradition in general. At most it could be argued there is some precedent for DAAA 
among some Catholic moral theologians in the 17th century. However, these ‘laxist’ views were 
highly controversial at the time, and the clearest examples of early DAAAs were condemned by the 
Holy Office in 1679.100 
 
The condemnations of laxism points to another problem with the appeal to probabilism, in that the 
framework of probablism, in its original historical context, presupposed acceptance of the authority 
of Rome to set limits on legitimate opinion. To advocate the permissibility of direct abortion requires 
moving beyond the tradition of probabilisim into what may be called a ‘theology of dissent’. As I 
have written elsewhere, ‘A famous laxist principle of the seventeenth century was that it was 
legitimate to follow any position that was defended by a theologian and that had not yet been 
condemned by the church.  However, even the laxists agreed that an opinion could not be held to be 
probable if it had been explicitly condemned by Rome.’101    
 
In response to Catholic forms of DAAA there have been a number of attempts by theologians to 
present a grand narrative of the tradition to showing that it consistently respects the life of the 
embryo at every stage of development.102 Nevertheless, despite the fundamental weakness of DAAA 
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by appeal to precedent, this form of argument has been very successful in gaining a following among 
Catholics who dissent from the Church’s moral teaching, both in scholarly contexts and more 
popular contexts.  
 
The transition from scholarly to popular contexts has been facilitated by abortion advocacy 
organisations such as Catholics for a Free Choice. Among their most popular publications is a short 
booklet length by Jane Hurst entitled The History of Abortion in the Catholic Church: The untold 
story.103 This has gone through several reprints and is frequently quoted. The same theme has also 
been picked up by writers who are alienated from the Church on a broader range of issues, of whom 
Uta Ranke-Heinemann104 and Peter de Rosa105 are good examples. Quotations and paraphrases of 
such authors and of academic activists such as Daniel Maguire and Daniel Dombrowski have been 
disseminated by magazine articles, pamphlets and, by that most viral of media, the internet. From 
these sources the argument has become especially popular in anti-religious or anti-clerical blogs and 
websites. These most popular expressions of DAAA commonly revert to the form it first had in the 
work of Joseph Fletcher, not a serious or sympathetic attempt to engage with the Catholic tradition, 
but an attempted reductio ad absurdum with the simple aim of showing the inconsistency of the 
Catholic tradition and hence undermining its authority. However, as argued above in relation to 
secular uses of the argument, such exercises in knocking down straw men serve only to obscure 
deeper differences between modern secular humanism and the Christian tradition in relation to the 
principle of the inviolability of human life. If the principle of the inviolability of human life is 
accepted, it is hard to show the Catholic tradition has been inconsistent. 
 
These reflections expose an underlying weakness in all forms of DAAA by appeal to precedent, for 
there is no precedent in the Christian tradition for the conclusion that abortion should be tolerated 
or advocated before animation, and furthermore, the fact that earlier thinkers reliant on ancient 
biology believed that animation occurred after the embryo was formed is not enough to show that it 
is reasonable to do so in the present day. To achieve its aim DAAA would have to show both (in 
relation to philosophical anthropology) that delayed animation, or some analogous idea, was 
credible in a contemporary context, and further, (in relation to ethics) that this implies the moral 
acceptability of early abortion. Rising to this challenge, a number of contemporary thinkers within 
the Catholic tradition have propounded anthropological forms of DAAA, primarily invoking the 
philosophical and moral principles of Thomas Aquinas. Such attempts fall roughly into two 
categories, those that appeal to brain-related criteria and those that are concerned with 
individuation.106  
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York: Doubleday, 1990). 
105 P. de Rosa, Vicars of Christ: The Dark Side of the Papacy (Dublin, Ireland: Poolbeg Press, 1988). 
106 Curran delineates a further argument among Catholic advocates of abortion, that the moral status of the 
embryo is not inherent but is conferred by the mother or by community. He cites Bernard Quelquejeu OP, 
Jacques Pohier OP and Louis Beirnaert SJ as examples (Curran, ‘Abortion’ pp. 180-185). However this relational 
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21 
 
 
Brain-related accounts of animation 
 
Donceel is significant not only for introducing into Catholic discussion a form of DAAA by appeal to 
precedent, but also for articulating a defense of a form of delayed animation based on Thomist 
principles. Donceel not only appealed to the tradition, he also argued that delayed animation was 
implied by Thomistic philosophical principles if these were applied to contemporary biology. He 
preferred the term ‘delayed hominization’ to delayed animation, in part because Thomas held that 
the embryo was animated with a soul from conception, but not a specifically human soul. Donceel 
took the term hominization from Karl Rahner who himself took it from Teihard de Chardin.107 The 
use of the term by de Chardin and Rahner draws on the analogy between individual development 
and the evolution of the human species, the same analogy invoked by Habgood and among Anglican 
writers on science and religion. Nevertheless, while Donceel regarded evolution as making delayed 
hominization ‘more probable’,108 this analogy is secondary to his key argument, which is that 
delayed hominization is implied by a Thomistic, hylomorphic conception of man.  
 
‘If form and matter are strictly complementary, as hylomorphism holds, there can be an actual 
human soul only in a body endowed with the organs required for the spiritual activities of man.’109  
 
Other philosophers who have followed Donceel and who have also appeal explicitly and in detail to 
Thomas are Michael Coughlan,110 Jean Porter,111 Dombrowski and Deltete 112, and Pasnau.113 For 
such writers, appeal to Thomas is not merely opportunistic as they show a genuine interest in the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas and, in at least some cases, have published serious monographs on 
other elements of Thomas’s thought. Nevertheless, if the appreciation of Thomas is genuine, these 
authors also wish to use his thought to promote a more permissive attitude towards practices such 
as abortion and embryonic stem cell research. In this they are very different from an earlier 
generation of Thomists (such as Mercier, de Dorlodot, Hering, Reany and Maritain) who defended 
delayed animation but not DAAA. These earlier Thomists, like Thomas himself, regarded the 
deliberate destruction of the early embryo as gravely wrong. 
 
Donceel defends the idea that the embryo is not a human person until he or she has the organs 
necessary for rational functioning, that is, until the development of ‘the brain, and especially the 
cortex’.114 Similarly Couglan, Porter, Dombrowski, Deltete and Pasnau focus on the capacity for 
rational functioning or at least for consciousness. This is superficially similar to the distinction 
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between a human being and a person made by secular bioethicists such as Fletcher, Tooley, Singer, 
and Harris. However, this secular bioethical school of thought is distinct from Thomism both in its 
origin and its character. The ‘personhood’ philosophers (if they can be termed such) were influenced 
by Locke’s definition of a person: ‘most current accounts of the criteria for personhood follow John 
Locke in identifying self-consciousness coupled with fairly rudimentary intelligence as the most 
important features’.115 They assimilate personhood to personality or memory, in marked contrast to 
the accounts of personhood of the kind propounded by Aristotle, Boethius or Thomas Aquinas, who 
regard the person as an individual substance.116 Personhood philosophers also tend to place the 
emergence of personhood in infancy, several months after the child is born. Donceel and Thomists 
who follow his line of thought strongly resist the claim that hominization occurs after the child is 
born, ‘The Church has condemned this position and rightly so’.117 Nevertheless, if what is needed is 
not the immediate capacity for rational acts (which is not demonstrable until long after the child is 
born), but rather, an active potential of a more radical kind, then this would seem to be present 
already in the embryo that has an active potential to develop a brain. This point is emphasised by 
the moral theologian Norman Ford. 
 
‘One weakness in Donceel’s position is the unjustified demand for the formation of sense organs and 
of the brain for rational ensoulment once it is admitted there are no actual rational functions 
performed for two years.’118  
 
Donceel’s account of delayed hominization also overlooks the significance of the power of 
development that the embryo is now known to possess. From a Thomistic perspective, if a being 
possesses a power to develop a power (for example the power to learn to speak French) this is 
sufficient to demonstrate what kind of thing it is (a linguistic animal). Thomas mistakenly thought 
that the human embryo only possessed a passive power to develop. He thought development was 
driven and shaped not from within but from without, by the power of the male parent through the 
seed as an instrument. However if, in line with modern biology, one regards development as a power 
of the embryo, the possession of this power implies the presence in the embryo of a specifically 
human soul.119 Pasnau recognised this difficulty and maintained that it is the parent’s DNA in the 
embryo that plays the role that Thomas ascribed to the power in the seed. It transforms the embryo 
until the embryo becomes a specifically human animal.120 However, the abstraction of the DNA from 
                                                          
115 Harris, ‘Euthanasia and the Value of Life’, p.  8. 
116 G.E.M. Anscombe, Human Life, Action and Ethics Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe Luke Gormally, Mary Geach 
(eds.) (St. Andrews: St Andrews  Studies in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2005) p. 268; D.A. Jones, ‘Incapacity and 
personhood: respecting the non-autonomous self’, in H. Watt (ed) Incapacity and Care: Controversies in 
healthcare and research (London: The Linacre Centre, 2009). 
117 Donceel, ‘Immediate Animation’, p. 101. 
118 Ford When did I begin?, p. 52. 
119 Jones, ‘The human embryo in the Christian tradition’, p. 712; J.T. Eberl, ‘Aquinas’s Account of Human 
Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (2005), pp. 379-394, p. 386; 
S. Heaney, ‘Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul in the Early Embryo’, The Thomist 56.1, 
(1992), pp. 19-48, pp. 27-30; J. Haldane and P. Lee, ‘Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion, and the Value of 
Life’, Philosophy 78 (2003), pp. 255-278,  pp. 270-271. 
120 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, p. 103. ; Haldane and Lee, ‘Aquinas on Human Ensoulment’, p. 
271. 
23 
 
the embryo as a whole, and indeed the abstraction of development from all other vital activities of 
the organism (which are likewise regulated by DNA), is not tenable as a philosophy of biology.  
 
Individuation-related accounts of animation 
 
Norman Ford criticised Donceel for his supposition that an embryo is not human until he or she has a 
functioning brain, a supposition that both seems unnecessary and seems to imply too much (that a 
child is not human until it actually exercises the power of reason). Nevertheless, if the embryo is a 
human being from the moment that it is a living individual with the power to develop, this still leaves 
the question of when the embryo becomes a living individual. One alleged proof of delayed 
hominization referred to in passing by Donceel121 is the argument that the early embryo is not yet an 
individual because it is possible within the first two weeks for one embryo to split so as to form 
identical twins. From this Donceel concluded that the early embryo is not yet an individual and 
hence cannot be a human individual with a rational soul.  
 
Arguments based on the phenomenon of twinning constitute a distinct form of DAAA based not on 
the need for a brain but on the concept of individuation. This is a very different form of delayed 
animation position with different implications. Technically it is not a form of DAAA in that it does not 
justify abortion, because animation is placed around the time of implantation and well before a 
woman would know she was pregnant. However, individuation-related arguments could be and 
have been used to advocate experimentation on human embryos and/or forms of birth control that 
appear to act after fertilisation by disrupting implantation (and hence lead to the destruction of 
human embryos). The use of delayed animation to defend destruction of human embryos is closely 
analogous to DAAA and for ease of reference will be termed here an individuation-related DAAA. 
 
The Jesuit Richard McCormick, employed an individuation-related DAAA to justify his decision, as a 
member of the Ethics Advisory Board in 1979, to endorse the use of human embryos who are not 
older than 14 days.122 McCormick likewise defended the use of the term ‘pre-embryo’ to refer to the 
first two weeks of human development.123 This same argument has been used by a number of other 
Catholic moral theologians including Curran,124 Mahoney125 and Eberl.126 These authors accepted 
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embryo experimentation but not the liberalisation of abortion law (or at least, they did not regard 
delayed animation as a reason for such liberalisation).127 
  
Perhaps the most well-known advocate of the individuation-related argument is Norman Ford in his 
book When did I begin? This book was written in 1988 four years after the Warnock report and two 
years before embryo experimentation was legalised in the UK by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. Warnock even contributed a foreword to the book. The book has had a 
significant impact and has helped undermine the case for the protection of the early embryo.  
 
It should be noted, however, that Ford was not himself in favour of experimentation on embryos. He 
always argued that even the earliest human embryo deserves ‘absolute respect’.128 In this his 
attitude was quite unlike that of McCormick who used delayed animation as a reason for defending 
embryo research. Thus while Ford defended an individuation-related form of delayed animation, he 
did not defend individuation-related DAAA, because he did not use it to defend the destructive use 
of human embryos. Ford, like Elizabeth Anscombe, who held a similar view,129 was closer in attitude 
to the delayed animationists writing between 1900 and 1950, and indeed to Thomas Aquinas 
himself, in defending delayed animation but not stripping the embryo of protection. Ford may have 
been naïve in making this argument how and when he did, but in fact he was not in favour of the 
legislation he helped to facilitate. 
 
It has been argued in this paper that, among DAAAs, those that appeal to anthropology are stronger 
than those that appeal only to historical precedent. Among DAAAs that appeal to anthropology, 
those related to individuation seem to be more widely accepted than those related to brain 
function. Nevertheless, while the phenomenon of twinning has led people to conclude that the 
human embryo is not truly an individual, this argument is not as strong as it first appears.  
 
From a biological perspective individuality need not imply indivisibility (in the sense of the inability 
to develop into multiple individuals). Many biological organisms are divisible at different stages of 
development.  The early embryo is, from the first, a whole and it develops as a whole. When the 
cells divide, the daughter cells have position in relation to the whole and the future differentiation of 
                                                          
127 Curran in 1973 defended a permissive approach to abortion legislation not on the basis of delayed 
animation (which he did not place late enough in pregnancy to be relevant to abortion) but on the basis of 
political pluralism. In this he followed R. Drinan, ‘Catholic Moral Teaching and Abortion Laws in America’, 
Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, XXIII (1968), pp. 118-130, though he did not go as 
far as Drinan who had argued that there should be no criminal sanctions for abortion (Curran, ‘Abortion’, p. 
170).  
128 N. Ford, The Prenatal Person (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p. 68. 
129 G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Were you a Zygote?’, in Griffiths, A.P. (ed.), Philosophy and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘The Early Embryo. Theoretical Doubts and Practical 
Certainties’, in G.E.M. Anscombe Faith in a Hard Ground. Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics, M. Geach, 
L. Gormally (eds), (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008). For another similar view see R. Berquist, ‘Abortion and the 
Right to Life Before Personhood’, in n S.J. Heaney, Abortion: A New Generation of Catholic Responses 
(Braintree, MA: The Pope John Centre, 1992). Nevertheless, it is striking how little support or even attention 
this position has attracted since the emergence of prominent Catholic forms of DAAA in 1970. By and large 
those who support delayed animation now accept DAAA and those who extend protection to the embryo from 
fertilisation defend immediate animation, at least as a probable opinion. 
25 
 
cells is a function of this position. This is so notwithstanding the fact that if some cells are detached 
from the whole, the embryo can sometimes reorganise so that no harm is done to its development. 
The early human embryo is certainly a biological individual. 
 
Divisibility is a problem not in relation to biology but only in relation to the rational soul which, 
according to Catholic doctrine, is immortal.130 However, if God can create and infuse a soul into the 
embryo at fertilisation then there is no reason to doubt that God could create and infuse further 
souls according to the multiplication of bodies. Twinning could then be understood as analogous to 
asexual reproduction in simpler animals, whereby new life is generated by division rather than by 
union. Thus, according to Thomas, a simple animal has ‘one soul in act and many in potency’.131This 
may be unusual and unexpected but both nature and grace include many unusual and unexpected 
things. What it is not, is a contradiction in terms.132 
 
It is in response to this and other arguments that Norman Ford, the most able and articulate 
defender of delayed animation by reason of delayed individuation, has subsequently abandoned this 
position. He has come to accept that the potential for twinning does not entail that the developing 
embryo is not an individual. Hence in 2007 he joined other Catholic bioethicists in affirming that ‘the 
human embryo, at every stage of development, is a human being with potential and not just a 
“potential human being”’133 Similarly Jason Eberl, who in 2005 defended an individuation-related 
form of DAAA134 by 2007 under the influence of Germain Grisez,135 Jan Deckers136 and others 
changed his view and came to accept animation at fertilisation.137 The same is true of some 
proponents of individuation-related DAAA outside the Catholic context, as is evident for example 
between the first (1996) and second (2005) edition of Gilbert Meilaender’s Bioethics: A Primer for 
Christians.138  
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In summary, while among contemporary Thomists, a number have argued that the rational soul is 
not present until sometime after conception, there is an important division among these thinkers as 
to whether ensoulment only occurs with brain development or whether it has could already have 
occurred by the 14-day stage. And if it is granted that the soul may already be present at 14 days 
after fertilisation, then the arguments against the presence of a soul from the very beginning do not 
seem indefeasible. Thus there are many Thomists who now argue that, ‘applying Aquinas’s 
metaphysical principles to the embryological facts uncovered since his time leads to the conclusion 
that the human being is present from fertilization on.’139  
 
If this body of respected theological opinion is sufficient to render immediate animation credible as 
a Christian opinion (which is more or less what the tradition understood by the word ‘probable’) 
then this presents a serious obstacle for anyone seeking to apply individuation-related DAAA in 
practice. If, from a contemporary Thomist perspective, the arguments are such that there is at least 
a reasonable doubt that the soul might be present from conception, then it seems that the embryo 
should receive the benefit of this doubt. On this basis, justice and charity would then require that, 
even if a human embryo were not certainly a person, he or she would nevertheless merit that 
utmost respect that is due to a human person. This interestingly seems to have been the practical 
conclusion of Norman Ford even when he himself was still inclined to accept a form of delayed 
animation. 
 
‘The Catholic Church has expressly not committed its teaching authority to the view that the zygote 
is already a person but admits there are reasonable grounds to support a personal presence in the 
zygote and consequently teaches, rightly in my view, that the human zygote should be morally and 
legally protected as a person. In this situation, Parliament, at least for the sake of its own moral 
standing in the community, should give the benefit of the doubt to the human embryo and ban all 
destructive experimentation on human embryos.’140 
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Conclusions 
 
The aim of the paper has been to trace the origin of a recent argument about abortion and embryo 
experimentation and to show how different expressions of the argument have emerged in different 
contexts. Though typically the argument is framed as an appeal to precedent, it transpires that there 
is little or no precedent for DAAA before the middle of the twentieth century.  
 
From the late 1950s the argument begins to appear first in secular contexts, then in the 1960s in 
Anglican and Catholic contexts. Some expressions of DAAA, especially those repeated in popular 
media and on the internet are little more than opportunistic appeals to history without serious 
engagement with the basis of the tradition. Despite the popularity of such expressions of DAAA, 
appeal to precedent alone is not a cogent argument.  
 
Other forms of DAAA raise important anthropological questions. Of these, the weakest expressions 
of DAAA are those which implicitly or explicitly rely on the analogy between embryonic development 
and the evolution of species. All analogies limp and to justify the applicability of this analogy would 
require more careful philosophical analysis than it has thus far attracted. Much stronger are those 
expressions of DAAA which appeal to Thomist philosophical principles and among these, the 
arguments concerned with the individuation of the embryo are more widely accepted than those 
that focus on brain function. Nevertheless even the stronger DAAAs are not indefeasible and in this 
paper it has been argued that, given the presence of a reasonable case that the soul may be present 
from fertilisation, then the human embryo should be granted the respect and protection due to a 
person. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
affirmation of a philosophical nature, but it constantly reaffirms the moral condemnation of any kind of 
procured abortion,’ Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Donum Vitae 1988:I.1, a stance maintained by 
John Paul II Evangelium vitae 1995: 60 and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Dignitas personae 
2008:5.  
